Political and Governance Challenges to Achieving Global HIV Goals with Injecting Drug Users: The Case of Pakistan by Khalid, Hina & Fox, Ashley M.
Political and Governance Challenges to Achieving Global 
HIV Goals with Injecting Drug Users: The Case of 
Pakistan
Hina Khalid1* ID , Ashley M. Fox2 
Abstract
Background: The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has recently set the ambitious “90-90-90 
target” of having 90% of people living with HIV (PLHIV) know their status, receive antiretroviral therapy (ART), and 
achieve viral suppression by 2020. This ambitious new goal is occurring in a context of global “scale-down” following 
nearly a decade of heightened investment in HIV prevention and treatment efforts. Arguably international goals spur 
action, however, setting unrealistic goals that do not take weak health systems and variations in the nature of the 
epidemic across countries into consideration may set them up for failure in unproductive ways that lead to a decline 
in confidence in global governance institutions. This study explores how policy actors tasked with implementing 
HIV programs navigate the competing demands placed upon them by development targets and national politics, 
particularly in the current context of waning international investments towards HIV. 
Methods: To examine these questions, we interviewed 29 key informants comprising health experts in donor 
organizations and government employees in HIV programs in Pakistan, a country where HIV programs must compete 
with other issues for attention. Themes were identified inductively through an iterative process and findings were 
triangulated with various data sources and existing literature. 
Results: We found both political and governance challenges to achieving the target, particularly in the context of the 
global HIV scale-down. Political challenges included, low and heterogeneous political commitment for HIV and a 
conservative legal environment that contributed towards a ban on opiate substitution therapy, creating low treatment 
coverage. Governance challenges includedstrained state and non-governmental organization (NGO) relations creating 
a hostile service delivery environment, weak bureaucratic and civil society capacity contributing to poor regulation of 
the health infrastructure, and resource mismanagement on both the part of the government and NGOs. 
Conclusion: Our findings suggest that in a context of waning international attention to HIV, policy actors on the 
ground face a number of practical hurdles to achieving the ambitious targets set out by international agencies. Greater 
attention to the political and governance challenges of implementing HIV programs in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) could help technical assistance agencies to develop more realistic implementation plans. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Epidemic control will be difficult to achieve as long as there is poor governance of the health system and low political support for HIV. 
• For successful service delivery through contracts, the government and civil society will need to work towards improving the governance of 
contracts. 
• Taking a more horizontal approach to service delivery, versus focusing on vertical programs, can help in improving health outcomes with 
reference to HIV and general health. 
Implications for the public
With waning global attention to HIV, vulnerable populations face increased obstacles to receiving care and treatment as governments fail to prioritize 
HIV and the behaviors that fuel it. Injecting drug use, the main mode of HIV transmission in the country is treated as a criminal act rather than a 
medical condition. Reduced HIV stigma and discrimination, through greater awareness and advocacy, can help people living with HIV (PLHIV) 
lead lives as equal citizens of society. 
Key Messages 
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Background 
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) has set a number of goals since the early years of 
the HIV epidemic including the 3 by 5 initiative (get 3 million 
people on antiretrovirals [ARVs] by 2005),1 the 15 by 15 
target (getting 15 million people on treatment by 2015)2 and 
the Getting to Zero strategy (zero new infections by 2015).3 
More recently, UNAIDS has set an ambitious goal of having 
90% of all people living with HIV (PLHIV) to know their 
status, receive antiretroviral therapy (ART), and achieve viral 
suppression by 2020, otherwise known as the 90-90-90 target.4 
This ‘treatment as prevention’ approach is being emphasized 
because of recent evidence of reduced risk of transmission 
from individuals who are virally suppressed.5
To meet this new target many countries will have to rapidly 
scale-up HIV service delivery in an environment where there 
is a decline in donor funding for HIV.6 Following an era of 
high HIV funding, with the largest annualized percentage 
change recorded between 2000-2010, development assistance 
for HIV is being scaled down. Between 2014 to 2015, 
donor funding for HIV decreased by 13% ($8.62 to $7.53 
billion).6 The decline in donor funding is the outcome of 
several interrelated factors: an appreciation of the dollar, 
accompanied by a depreciation of donor currencies; a delay 
in contributions by the United States, the largest contributor 
towards development assistance for HIV; and front-loaded 
contributions to the Global Fund by donors.6 In spite of 
scale-down, in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), 
HIV continues to remain one of the most heavily funded 
sectors. The ratio of government spending to development 
assistance for HIV in these countries is twenty times higher 
as compared to the ratio of development assistance for health 
to government spending.7 Therefore, PLHIV in LMICs, will 
be among those who are the hardest hit by these funding 
cuts as there is heavy reliance on development assistance for 
funding HIV programs, making these countries susceptible to 
fluctuations in development assistance.7 
While HIV funding remains an important source of 
revenue for health systems in LMICs, previous research has 
revealed the perverse effects stemming from the decade long 
donor infusions of HIV specific funding. These include the 
vertical nature of HIV funding, which focused narrowly on 
getting “drugs into bodies”8 without attention to the broader 
need to strengthen health systems to deliver care and primary 
healthcare.9-12 Likewise, the exceptional nature of the HIV 
response led to a misalignment between the actual health 
needs of countries and the AIDS-specific funding provided 
to LMICs, often leading countries to position themselves as 
suffering from HIV at the expense of other, more pressing 
health concerns.9 Although prominent studies have found 
that HIV funding has not necessarily “crowded out” donors’ 
support for other health programs13 due to overall increases 
in global aid,14 there is increasing evidence that the narrow, 
vertical basis of HIV funding has created unintended 
consequences that have weakened already fragmented health 
systems.15 For instance, HIV-specific funding has been argued 
to have affected the health work force, pulling the limited 
number of well-trained health workers into better paid 
positions in AIDS non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and out of the public sector, compounding health worker 
shortages in LMICs.16,17 In addition to the misalignment of 
priorities precipitated by the rapid increase in dedicated 
HIV spending, research has identified the principal-agent 
problems created by the misaligned incentives between 
donors and local communities. Local officials, the agents, 
face competing pressures from donors (external principals) 
who provide funding for HIV interventions and the people 
whom they represent (local principals). While external 
principals prioritize HIV interventions, local principals are 
often more interested in addressing other pressing health and 
development concerns. Misalignment of priorities creates 
pressures on agents for implementing the global goals.11 
While some credit global targets such as the 90-90-90 
with developing common goals that spur action and channel 
effort among governments,18-20 others are more skeptical 
of global consensus documents that lack enforceability 
mechanisms. For instance, Easterly argues that the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) are unactionable, unquantifiable, 
with almost all aspects of development occupying a top 
priority, and no concrete commitment of funding to meet 
the goals.21 Others echo his concerns in arguing that the 
goals are not well developed, have contradictory trade-offs, 
and countries with low sustainable development indicators 
face a bigger challenge in achieving these goals.22,23 Moreover, 
while treatment as prevention is a promising approach to 
reducing HIV transmission that does not require behavior 
change interventions, which have been shown to be relatively 
ineffective, others have criticized this approach, noting that 
this bio-medicalization of prevention efforts has a perverse 
effect on HIV activism, rights-based prevention and structural 
interventions.24,25 It is also argued that people in poorer 
countries only have access to the cheapest cocktail drugs that 
can have harmful consequences. Finally, the combination of 
funding cuts and propagation of biomedical methods has led 
to a health workforce which is overworked and disillusioned.15 
As countries embark on achieving the new 90-90-90 HIV 
targets, research does not fully enumerate the challenges 
developing countries might face in achieving these targets, 
and the new target’s potential impact on countries’ overall HIV 
response. This study aimed to explore how different policy 
actors were navigating the challenges posed by the evolving 
global HIV response in a country with a conservative climate 
towards HIV, a large injecting drug user (IDU) population, 
and competing health sector priorities.
Setting
Pakistan is an important case to study in the context of HIV 
scale-down in that, like many LMICs, it represents a country 
with a weak domestic political commitment to HIV and a 
tepid policy response. While heightened global attention 
to HIV may have temporarily bolstered the response in an 
otherwise weakly committed country, the scale-down of 
resources is likely to affect the response even more profoundly 
as there is little political support for the issue.26,27 In contrast 
with countries with generalized epidemics, in Pakistan 
HIV prevalence remains low (less than 0.1% of the adult 
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population), and is concentrated among IDUs.28 In 2011, the 
estimated number of IDUs in Pakistan was 46 351 and the 
HIV sero-prevalence among them was 37.8%.29 These rates 
are much higher than the overall global prevalence of HIV 
among IDUs (13.1%),30 and consequently, most funding and 
attention has gone towards addressing HIV in this highly 
marginalized and unorganized population. However, in 
the absence of global attention, this group remains highly 
vulnerable.
Pakistan’s HIV response is best described as tepid. There 
is high disease stigma,31 no stated commitment by heads of 
state regarding HIV32 and budgetary commitment to address 
the disease remains very low. In 2015, the contribution of 
international and domestic sources for HIV program activities 
was $6.36 million and $3.63 million respectively.33 On the 
policy side, needle exchange programs are prohibited by law, 
but are still allowed to operate in the country.34 However, 
opioid substitution therapy is not allowed in the country.35 In 
terms of offering protection to PLHIV in terms of employment 
and discrimination, Sindh, is the only province that has 
currently passed a bill to protect PLHIV, however it has not 
translated it into effective implementation.36 For the other 3 
provinces, legislation does not directly protect PLHIV from 
discrimination at work or in acquiring work. According to a 
recent report by United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), there might be some protection available to PLHIV 
under the Disabled Person Ordinance, 1981, as it reserves at 
least 1% of employment within a province for people with 
some disease or health condition. Yet, it is unclear if PLHIV 
benefit from the Disabled Person Ordinance.37 HIV treatment 
and prevention efforts are further complicated by Pakistan’s 
recent experience with devolution, in the presence of a weak 
health system.38 In 2011, the Ministry of Health was dissolved 
and health policy formation and planning was devolved 
to the provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber 
Pukhtoonkhwa). With devolution in 2011, HIV program 
administrators have had to perform expanded functions, such 
as developing their own context-specific strategies and action 
plans.39 Other challenges faced by the health system include, a 
weak coordinating authority at the federal level, capacity and 
implementation constraints, and inadequate interprovincial 
information sharing.40 Pakistan also suffers from low overall 
health system capacity. Health in general remains a low 
priority for the government- the government of Pakistan 
spends approximately 0.5% of its gross domestic product 
(GDP) on health.41 In 2013-2014, total health expenditure 
was Rs. 757 billion ($6.2 billion), out of which Rs. 243 billion 
($1.99 billion) was spent by the public sector and Rs. 508 
billion ($4.17) by the private sector.42
In terms of global pressure, HIV is a sector with heavy 
foreign involvement. International donor organizations are 
the largest source of revenue for HIV prevention, treatment 
and care in the country. The involvement of major donor 
organizations has changed over time based on shifts in the 
donor landscape. From 2003-2009, HIV program activities 
were shaped by the World Bank, through a partnership 
between the World Bank and the national and provincial HIV 
programs (the Enhanced HIV/AIDS Control Program).43 
With the withdrawal of the World Bank in 2010, the Global 
Fund[1] became the main financer of HIV related efforts. 
In 2015 it committed approximately $27.7 million for HIV 
efforts in Pakistan for 3 years. The highest spending is on 
prevention activities (IDUs are the largest focus of HIV 
prevention activities),33 followed by care and treatment. 
Services to HIV high-risk populations are provided through 
collaboration between the implementing partners of the 
Global Fund,44 which for Pakistan are the national AIDS 
Control program, the provincial AIDS Control programs, 
and NGOs.45 NGOs are hired on contracts by the provincial 
AIDS Control programs through a competitive bidding 
process.46 These NGOs provide needles to IDUs through 
needle exchange programs and in doing so are at the forefront 
of harm reduction interventions in the country. 
Consequently, local forces (the politically contentious 
nature of HIV, the country’s recent experience with 
devolution, and high HIV disease burden among IDUs) 
and international forces (Pakistan’s place among the high 
impact HIV countries, donor funding for HIV warranting 
results, and increased global pressure to meet new targets) 
have created an environment that can exert an opposing pull 
on HIV service provision. The interplay between local and 
international forces makes it interesting to study the types of 
challenges HIV programs in Pakistan face in achieving the 
new 90-90-90 targets. 
Methods
Data Collection 
Participants 
Twenty-nine individuals were interviewed (23 semi-
structured, key informant interviews and 2 group interviews) 
between January 2015 to February 2015. Respondents were 
health and HIV experts in international organizations, and 
government employees from the national AIDS Control 
Program and provincial AIDS Control Programs in 3 
provinces: Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa. These 
respondents were selected as they were involved either in HIV 
policy formation, program management or implementation. 
Due to security concerns of traveling in Balochistan to 
conduct in-person interviews, 2 interviews with HIV program 
staff were conducted by phone, and more interviews were not 
arranged. Interviews could not be arranged with the Ministry 
of Narcotics Control, an organization whose mandate focuses 
on controlling the use and circulation of illegal drugs in the 
country.47 Parliamentarians were not interviewed as they were 
not involved in HIV policy formation or implementation. 
Respondents from HIV programs were recruited by 
contacting senior management in the health department, who 
subsequently referred us to a key informant within the HIV 
program. Further recruitment of respondents within HIV 
programs took place through snowball sampling. The number 
of key informants (that is, individuals who focused on policy 
formation or implementation) within each HIV program 
informed the sample size for each HIV program. While all 
respondents in HIV programs had a general understanding of 
the challenges faced by the programs, however, based on their 
position in the program, some were able to elaborate more on 
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the day-to-day challenges faced by the programs, while others 
on the broader policy aspects. Taken together, their responses 
helped in building a richer and more comprehensive picture 
of the challenges faced by the programs. Respondents for 
international organizations were recruited by contacting 
senior management in the organizations, and subsequently 
being connected to the health or HIV expert within the 
organization. The number of key international organizations 
in the HIV landscape determined the selection of international 
organizations (See Table).
Interview Procedures 
One researcher (the first author) conducted all interviews. 
The interviews lasted between 45 to 90 minutes. They were 
audio taped and transcribed verbatim where the interviewee 
consented, and in other instances field notes were taken. 
Seven interviewees, one from an international organization 
and 6 from HIV programs, did not consent to being recorded, 
and so field notes were taken. We had 2 interview guides, one 
for international organizations and another one for the HIV 
program employees. The interview guides were developed 
to generate conversation48 and focused on the strengths and 
challenges faced by the HIV programs. The interview guide 
for international organizations focused on understanding 
the scope of the organization’s involvement with HIV, 
political commitment for HIV across the provinces, and 
factors contributing to the concentrated epidemic in country. 
The interview guide for HIV program employees focused 
on understanding policy evolution, policies towards risk 
groups, needle exchange programs, experience working with 
NGOs, political support, financing arrangements, and factors 
contributing to the concentrated epidemic in country. As this 
paper is part of a larger research study, while the interview 
guides touched on a variety of policy and program areas, 
some of them are not included in this paper (See interview 
guides in Supplementary file 1)
Human Subjects Protection 
Participation in interviews was voluntary and identities were 
anonymized for confidentiality. Prior to the interviews, the 
objective of the research was explained to all participants, 
and consent for tape recording was obtained. The University 
at Albany’s Internal Review Board reviewed the interview 
guide and deemed it exempt as respondents were official 
representatives of HIV programs who were answering 
questions in their official capacity. 
Data Analysis 
We used an inductive interpretivist approach to coding the 
transcripts and field notes, whereby codes emerged from 
the data and were not determined in advance.49,50 First, all 
transcripts were open coded by reading each transcript line by 
line and then assigning codes to sentences and paragraphs.51 
These codes reflected a theme or an idea that was being 
expressed in the text. The coding process was iterative and 
repeated for each interview. After open coding all transcripts, 
the codes from each interview were reviewed and consolidated 
into broader, more meaningful categories to form sub-themes, 
and from them common themes were formed.52,53 The first 
author coded the data, and the second author reviewed the 
codes. The first author discussed the codes, themes and sub-
themes with the second author for data validation.54 Findings 
from the interviews are triangulated in the discussion section 
of the paper using information from newspapers and existing 
academic literature. 
Results 
Key informants described challenges to meeting global HIV 
targets, which we categorized into 2 overarching themes of 
political challenges and governance challenges (see Box 1). 
Political challenges encompassed factors related to the degree 
of “political commitment” of country leadership and the 
policy and legal environment in which those charged with 
implementing programs operated. We understood “political 
commitment” to constitute 3 interrelated components, 
expressed, institutional and budgetary commitment. 
Expressed commitment refers to declarations of public 
support for HIV by prominent personnel in a country. 
Budgetary commitment is related to allocations for HIV 
programming, while institutional commitment focuses 
on the establishment of AIDS bureaucracies, adoption of 
policies, legislation, and HIV surveillance and monitoring 
systems.55 Governance challenges encompassed factors 
related to the service delivery environment including health 
system management, resource shortages and state-NGO 
relations. We understood “governance” as factors influencing 
decision-making procedures, rules and norms, in a given 
policy domain, around which managers converge that affect 
Table.  Breakdown of Interviews
Respondent Type Mode of Inquiry
Federal government
National AIDS Control Program 2 in-person semi-structured interviews
Provincial governments
Punjab AIDS Control Program 5 in-person semi-structured interviews 
Sindh AIDS Control Program 5 in-person semi-structured interviews; 1 in-person semi structured group interview (4 participants) 
Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa AIDS Control Program 1 in-person interview; 1 email interview; 1 in-person semi structured group interview (6 participants)  
Balochistan AIDS Control Program 2 phone interviews 
International organizations 
5 in-person semi-structured interviews; 2 phone interviews with respondents from 6 international 
organizations
Source: Authors own tabulations.
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the implementation of policies.56
Political Challenges
Low Political Commitment Hinders Budget Allocation and 
Support for Needle Exchange Programs 
According to most respondents, political commitment was an 
important factor in ensuring the success of health programs 
as it determined which program was financed, programs with 
higher political commitment were more likely to get funded. 
The views of most respondents can best be summarized as: 
“If the political leadership is committed then you can get 
financing for the program from the Chief Minister and the 
Finance Department. If you do not have a strong liaison with 
Finance Department, and the Planning and Development 
department, then you cannot get resources” (Government 
employee).
Almost all respondents reported low political 
commitment for HIV and gave examples of expressed 
and budgetary commitment to express low political 
commitment. To quote one respondent on low budgetary 
commitment: 
“The government has no commitment as such. A 
government is committed when it creates fiscal space for 
something. I would say it is not even committed to health, so 
HIV is really down in that list” (International organization).
Almost all respondents in international organizations and 
across government departments discussed several reasons for 
low HIV support, which hampered their ability to effectively 
respond to the disease in ways that would be likely to further 
Overall policy environment
•	 Low health budget
•	 Pakistan is a drug route for Afghanistan and so a large 
number of drugs and drug users 
•	 Injecting drug use and sex work are illegal in the country. 
Maternal and child health, and other diseases receiver greater 
attention from the government 
•	 Needle programs are currently operational in the country, 
but fall in the ambit of prohibited practices
•	 Opioid substitution therapy is banned in the country
Governance challenges
•	 Limited healthcare infrastructure, poor regulation and 
management across the health sector
•	 Resource mismanagement and shortage 
•	 NGO-state relationship management complicates service 
provision
Political challenges
•	 Limited & heterogeneous political commitment for HIV
•	 The conservative legal environment adds complexity to 
treating IDUs due to the ban on opioid substitution therapy
Abbreviations: IDUs, injecting drug users; NGO, non-governmental 
organization.
Box 1. Factors Influencing Achieving the 90-90-90 Target for IDUs and 
Their Interconnections
international targets. These included, a shift in global 
focus away from HIV, the lack of a champion for HIV, and 
stigma and discrimination, which hampered political will 
to prioritize this issue. Respondents also discussed low HIV 
disease burden in the general population and HIV being in 
competition with other diseases and health conditions as 
factors that impeded attention to the disease. They explained 
that the government was especially focusing on improving 
maternal and child health and polio indicators, as Pakistan is 
now one of the very few countries that has been unsuccessful 
in eradicating polio or providing a nurturing environment for 
infants and mothers. Drawing comparisons between HIV and 
other health conditions, one respondent remarked: 
“There is no political commitment, the focus is on polio 
and nutrition. [..] We have done a lot of advocacy in the 
Ministry, but the Planning Commission is saying that we 
don’t consider it important” (Government employee).
Given the recent decentralization efforts, political 
commitment was also variable across the provinces. For 
instance, respondents also discussed how differences in 
political commitment across the provinces affected the 
use of needle exchange programs. While needle exchange 
programs were being implemented in Punjab, Sindh, 
and Balochistan at the time of the interviews, Khyber 
Pukhtoonkhwa did not have a needle exchange program. 
A few respondents in the HIV program of Khyber 
Pukhtoonkhwa highlighted that this was due to the 
conservative nature of the Pathans[2] that the program could 
not be implemented. In terms of differences in political 
commitment across the provinces for HIV programs, all 
HIV experts in international organizations ranked Punjab 
as having the highest commitment to HIV, followed by 
Sindh, Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, and Balochistan. According 
to one respondent: 
“Punjab would be first, because as much as Sindh does 
realize the issue, it is not a priority because they have 
other priorities. Balochistan, well, someone from a donor 
organization[3] wrote to them and said that we will give you 
the money and you use it on your health. They said, we don’t 
need the money, we need to build roads. So Punjab, number 
1, Sindh, number 2, KPK, number 3, and Balochistan, 
number 4” (International organization).
To triangulate the ranking of political commitment for HIV 
programs across the provinces by international organizations, 
government HIV program respondents were asked to 
report their own perception of the political commitment 
for HIV in their respective provinces. To give an example 
of political commitment, all HIV program respondents in 
government departments (across Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber 
Pukhtoonkhwa) referred to the approval of the financial 
document, the Planning Commission Form 1 (PC-1) – a 
work plan document with cost estimates for a project – to 
signal government support for the program. For Punjab and 
Sindh, this document had been approved while for Khyber 
Pukhtoonkhwa it was still pending. Additionally, a key 
respondent in the HIV program in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa 
highlighted that HIV was a very low priority for the 
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government as it was focusing on a reform of the health 
sector, and it was plausible that the funding for HIV would 
be diverted towards these reform efforts. Information on how 
successful the approval of the PC-1 in Balochistan had been 
could not be obtained. 
The Conservative Legal Environment Adds Complexity to 
Meeting the 90-90-90 Targets 
The low political commitment of the government to HIV 
was also visible in the policy environment in which program 
implementers worked where the “institutional commitment” 
of the government was weak. Needle exchange programs are 
tolerated, although not supported by legislation. However, 
according to several respondents, opioid use is criminalized 
in Pakistan and faces harsh penalties as like sex work it falls 
under the category of addictive un-Islamic behavior. To quote 
one respondent: 
“Injecting drug use is illegal, because it is a form of 
addiction and sex work is also illegal here in the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan” (Government employee).
A few respondents discussed that it was important for HIV 
programs to take the religious environment of the country 
into consideration while devising policy and program 
activities. Giving examples of the importance of religious 
groups in influencing program decisions, one respondent 
highlighted that while needle programs and condoms prevent 
HIV transmission, religious groups were not in favor of such 
programs as they assumed that they could lead to an increase 
in HIV transmission. Another respondent remarked that 
efforts to change the legal environment surrounding sex 
work in Pakistan, or bringing too much attention to current 
service interventions for sex workers, could have negative 
consequences for HIV programs and should be avoided. 
According to the respondent: 
“There are certain things that should be left the way they 
are as they allow you room to work. So far, no one has not 
allowed us to work with FSWs [female sex workers], to 
provide condoms or tell them, ‘this is how you should go about 
it.’ But, just saying that they are FSW, half the maulvis[4] will 
be out on the street telling you not to do this. [..] So far the 
work is being done, the government knows but society doesn’t 
know, and let it happen. But, once they find out that this 
is happening then they won’t even let this happen. So, it is 
more dangerous to address and start flagging those issues” 
(International organization). 
As with sex work and needle programs, legislation does not 
support the use of opiate substitution therapy in Pakistan. 
The 90-90-90 targets stipulate that 90% of all PLHIV receive 
ART, and achieve viral suppression by 2020, but in order for 
viral suppression to be reached, adherence to ART is key. 
Yet, respondents described that physicians were reluctant to 
treat active drug users over a concern that irregular medicine 
use could lead to the development of a resistant strain of the 
virus. Most of the government respondents highlighted that 
both the increase in ART coverage and physician concerns of 
adherence to ART could be simultaneously achieved if the use 
of opiate substitution therapy (a replacement drug which is 
administered in clinical settings to counter opiate dependency 
among drug users) is introduced in Pakistan. They added that 
while, world over, the use of opiate substitution therapy has 
been shown to improve adherence to ART, the Ministry of 
Narcotics Control has banned the use of opiate substitution 
therapy, despite advocacy by HIV program employees, due to 
concerns of drug pilferage and for introducing a new drug 
in the market. Drawing parallels with Iran, a country which 
like Pakistan has a huge IDU population, one respondent 
remarked: 
“They are saying that this drug will slip, and there will 
be leakage in the market. We tried to convince them that 
600 000 people in Iran are on methadone treatment […] but 
our Ministry doesn’t agree with it” (Government employee).
Consequently, HIV programs focus on providing treatment 
to IDUs living with their families, as they are easier to track 
and exclude active drug users, who are street-based, from 
treatment. According to one respondent: 
“You have all IDUs, and so I can’t even put 40% of my 
patients on treatment. UNAIDS/WHO guidelines for 2016 
are, treatment for all. In Pakistan as we have a high proportion 
of IDUs we can’t really implement this” (Government 
employee). 
Therefore, according to the respondents a large portion 
of IDUs are excluded from treatment and Pakistan cannot 
comply with the ‘prevention for all’ treatment guidelines.
Governance Challenges 
Weak Health System and Financial Management
Almost all government employees provided examples of poor 
regulation and management across the health sector, and 
discussed the harmful consequences associated with it. Most 
respondents highlighted that ineffective blood screening and 
poor control of hospital infections posed a challenge for the 
health system, including HIV. Highlighting the importance of 
taking a horizontal versus a vertical approach to addressing 
HIV, one respondent remarked: 
“HIV is not an island and so the work I do is not done 
in isolation [….] When your entire health system functions 
well, then every communicable disease will be controlled, and 
HIV will be controlled and will be part of that” (Government 
employee).
A few respondents highlighted that low health system 
outreach and capacity had led to an expansion of unregulated 
private sector providers, called ‘quacks.’ These unregulated 
providers increased the overall level of risk in the system 
as they often did not take the required safety precautions. 
Respondents explained that while there have been several 
positive developments such as efforts to control quackery, 
and a disposable syringe act in Sindh, to control the re-use 
of syringes, they had not been enforced due to low regulatory 
capacity. Referring to one respondent: 
“In Jalalpur Jutta, a quack was using unsterilized syringes 
and this led to a massive outbreak of HIV/AIDS” (Government 
employee).
A few respondents in government departments expressed 
concerns regarding the spread of HIV from the IDUs to 
their spouses and one respondent remarked that it was the 
outcome of poor linkage to care. In terms of resources, a few 
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respondents described that HIV resources were only sufficient 
to provide services to a very small portion of the IDUs, which 
was preventing the expansion of program activities. Quoting 
one respondent: 
“Theory says that if you want to control your epidemic 
then you have to give prevention services to 80% of the high 
risk group, now through Global Fund Support we just reach 
17% of IDUs” (Government employee). 
While a few respondents discussed insufficiency of funds, 
almost all respondents in government departments and several 
respondents in international organizations discussed that a 
more substantial obstacle to meeting targets, as compared to 
the availability of resources, was resource mismanagement. 
Examples of mismanagement included misplaced resource 
allocation priorities and a lack of spending capacity, a problem 
experiences by government departments more generally, due 
to which funds get lapsed. To quote one respondent: 
“Resources are not an issue. I work here, I know resources 
are there. Utilization of resources is poor. We will use Rs. 
400 000 on a meeting and will not spend on a center. So there 
is a need to fix direction” (Government employee).
As the quotation above implies the amount of resources 
available for HIV were not in short supply. However, the 
processes by which decisions were made on how to allocate 
funds were not made in a rational or transparent manner. 
Following a discussion of the weaknesses in the current 
health infrastructure, most government employees explained 
that post devolution, there was a need to strengthen the health 
infrastructure through better regulation and management 
and by developing capacity for planning and implementing 
policy. A few respondents highlighted that frequent transfers 
of government employees, hampered effective monitoring of 
operations, as by the time a government employee understood 
the intricacies of the program, he/she was transferred to a 
different location. They also pointed to a need for program 
evaluation, arguing that all the emphasis was on preparing 
program reports with little attention being given to evaluating 
the effectiveness of programs. 
Challenges in Governing State–Non-governmental Organization 
Relations
Harm reduction services for both IDUs and other risk 
groups are delivered through NGOs hired on contracts. All 
government respondents regarded NGOs as essential for HIV 
programs for 2 main reasons. First, almost all respondents 
highlighted that NGOs have extensive outreach in the HIV 
high-risk communities, as many NGO workers are also ex-
drug users and sex workers. Service delivery through NGO 
workers is preferred as NGO workers know the hot-spot areas 
and are also perceived as being from within the communities. 
Consequently drug users and sex workers do not hide from 
them, enabling service delivery. In contrast, the government 
is considered an outsider who is responsible for criminalizing 
their behavior and so they hide from the government. 
Second, a few respondents highlighted that as drug users and 
sex workers are punishable by law and so the government 
cannot openly provide them with HIV program services. 
AIDS programs expect to face resistance from politicians and 
religious communities if the government is seen providing 
services to these populations. According to one respondent: 
“One of the main issues we faced was that can we give 
services to populations that are considered illegal? As a 
government, can we do that? No, we cannot, and so we chose 
to go through the NGOs. The second thing is that these are 
hidden populations and they do not want to come in front of 
the government. [..] The other thing is that these NGOs are 
deep-rooted, and are very close to the communities. They are 
ex-sex workers, ex-drug users and have very close relations 
with these populations” (Government employee).
While the preceding discussion highlights that NGOs are 
essential for the government for effective service delivery, 
almost all respondents who described the importance of 
NGOs for the government also expressed concern regarding 
ineffective use of government funds by NGOs, given the 
nature of the partnership. A few respondents expressed 
concerns that as the same NGOs were repeatedly hired for 
delivering services, they had learnt how to game the system. 
They argued that the same work could be done more cost 
effectively by other newer actors, if given a chance. The views 
of respondents can best be summarized as: 
“HIV is not a pleasant sector. There are a lot of conflicting 
interests. This is not a selfless type thing that a nun comes 
and controls leprosy. This is a public-private partnership 
and so there are a lot of interests. I am sitting here as a 
government employee, so I will want a good outcome but 
the other person may not want the same. When you have 
an NGO and I have to implement my work through them, 
the well being of the patient is inversely proportional to the 
well being of the organization, unfortunately. This is not how 
it should be, but it is. As much importance you give to the 
organization, that much the patient will be neglected. Needle 
exchange programs are good, but when I see the budgets, 
sometimes, I feel like laughing that how can an outreach 
worker distribute 100 syringes in one day? So if he says to 
me I went to x-y-z places, some places are just not possible” 
(Government employee). 
While interviews with government employees highlighted 
the importance of the NGOs for the government and the 
relationship challenges, a few respondents from international 
organizations described that the relationship between NGOs 
and the government was strained, and often created a hostile 
environment for both sides. According to one respondent: 
“This is a problem at both ends and so you cannot blame 
only one side. [….] Majority of NGOs that work in province x[5] 
[…], they join hands together against the government […] The 
government sometimes with a stroke of the pen says that we will 
finish your funding […].” (International organization). 
In the quotation above the respondent is ascribing 
responsibility for the tense relationship between NGOs and 
the government to both actors.
Discussion 
Using Pakistan as a case, we explored the challenges to the 
implementation of HIV programs that are likely to hinder the 
country’s ability to meet ambitious goals such as the 90-90-
90 target. We found both political and governance challenges 
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to achieving the target, particularly in the context of the 
global HIV scale-down. Political challenges included, low 
support for HIV and a conservative legal environment that 
contributed towards the ban on opiate substitution therapy 
creating low treatment coverage. Governance challenges 
included poor regulation and management of the weak health 
infrastructure, resource mismanagement, and strained state-
NGO relations. 
Recent literature on health system strengthening emphasizes 
the importance of governance,57 develops a number of 
frameworks for assessing governance,58-60 and highlights 
a positive relationship between governance and health 
outcomes.60,61 Studies have shown that effective governance of 
health sector organizations can lead to better implementation 
and uptake of health technologies.62 Higher regulatory 
quality and strong public sector financial management, core 
components of governance,63 are associated with lower infant 
mortality rates,64 reduced corruption , and increased public 
health spending.65 However, despite the widely established 
benefits of governance, LMICs suffer from weak institutions, 
poor public infrastructure, low legal capacity,66 and weak 
accountability mechanisms.67 The need for domestic 
governance is further exacerbated by inadequate governance 
of the international response to HIV.68 Governance of 
intellectual property rights influences access to medicines in 
LMICs,68 yet recent evidence suggests that PLHIV in LMICs 
do not have access to high quality drugs.15 Similarly, the 
mismatch between donor and local priorities11 can partially 
be attributed to the inability of LMICs to participate in 
decision-making at the global institutional level.68 Finally, a 
number of stakeholders working on a variety of externally 
driven health initiatives,69 including HIV, has burdened 
governments in LMICs who do not have the capacity to 
manage multiple programs, suggesting a need for better 
harmonization of policy responses.70 Our findings support 
existing literature on the need for better governance across 
LMICs, as we identify weak governance of the health system, 
poor resource management,38 and a need to regulate informal 
health providers in Pakistan.71,72 Our results also highlight 
the importance of developing global targets that take local 
contexts and political factors into consideration, as the ban 
on opiate substitution therapy prevents implementation 
of the ‘global treatment for all’ policy target. Our findings 
add to the literature on health governance by providing 
evidence of a need to improve governance of contracts. 
While research on governance in health emphasizes 
strengthening health systems73 and leadership,74 health system 
governance frameworks devote little attention to exploring 
and emphasizing the role of non-governmental actors in 
governance.75 Yet, changing government structures76 call for 
greater governance of state-NGO relations, as unequal power 
sharing and competing ideologies can lead to hostility and 
mistrust between these actors.77,78 Consistent with another 
study on Pakistan, which identified a tense state-NGO 
relationship,46 we find a lack of trust between NGOs, hired for 
delivering services to HIV risk groups which can prove to be 
detrimental for service provision.79
We also find support for the importance of political 
commitment in influencing program outcomes. Political 
commitment is important for mounting a successful response 
to HIV.55 Higher political commitment is linked with budgetary 
authorizations,80-82 laws that support distribution and use of 
needles,83,84 and adoption of service delivery programs.83-85 Our 
respondents discuss political commitment as a determinant 
of funding allocations, for bringing an item on to the policy 
agenda, and also for getting drug laws approved. Our findings 
highlight that while Pakistan did adopt a relatively effective 
needle exchange program across Punjab and Sindh, despite 
the absence of legislation supporting such a program, it has 
been unsuccessful in implementing ‘treatment for all’ due 
to the ban on opiate substitution therapy.35 More generally, 
overall low political commitment for HIV, a heavy reliance 
on donor funding, delays in budget approval, and budget 
preferences for other diseases highlight that politics plays a 
major role in the effective functioning of the health system 
in Pakistan.86 Our findings also highlight that in addition to 
political support from the government, program managers 
also have to be wary of different interest groups in the country 
while devising policy and program activities. Interest groups, 
especially religious groups, have been shown to influence 
public policy across countries.87 Our findings support this 
existing literature as our respondents were sensitive towards 
the sentiment of religious actors in the country. More 
specifically, HIV programs distance themselves from service 
provision by choosing to deliver services through NGOs, 
and avoid drawing unnecessary attention to HIV program 
activities to avoid backlash from religious groups and the 
other civil society actors. 
There are several implications of our findings. Our 
findings point to the importance of governance and 
political commitment for achieving the 90-90-90 target. 
They highlight that local contexts make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve global goals. Several suggestions 
from our respondents such as effectively engaging the 
government, and creating champions88 to garner support for 
HIV can help in increasing political commitment towards 
HIV. Other strategies to build political commitment can 
include collaboration and coalition building across different 
government sectors and with actors outside the government60 
through repetition and reinforcement of AIDS prevention and 
treatment messages. More recently, big data and biomedical 
approaches have been promoted to garner support. However, 
it is important to be aware of the benefits and limitations of 
such approaches. For example, variation in data quality and 
coverage, reaching hidden populations, procedures governing 
data sharing and transparency, all point towards a need to 
be critical towards an overreliance on big data. Similarly, 
excessive bio medicalization of HIV, has pushed important 
challenges of dealing with HIV, such as HIV stigma into the 
background.24 Our findings also imply a need for improved 
governance, especially in context of the current global scale 
down of HIV funding. Given the strained state-civil society 
relationship, they highlight the importance of tailoring the 
style of governance to match changing service provision 
structures. Our findings suggest that as governments move 
towards delivering services through contracts, they will need 
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to re-think which combination of the 3 modes of governance 
– authoritarian, transactional or persuasion[6] – is most suited 
to achieving effective service provision.89
Our study has several limitations. We were only able to 
interview 2 respondents from the Balochistan HIV program 
due to security concerns, and were unable to arrange 
interviews with NGO outreach workers. There was only one 
interviewer and coder for the study and this could lead to 
researcher bias, however, an effort was made to overcome this 
through a thorough review and discussion of codes and sub-
themes by the second author. 
Conclusion
This study aimed to explore how different policy actors were 
navigating the challenges posed by the evolving global HIV 
response in a country with a conservative climate towards 
HIV, a large IDU population, and competing health sector 
priorities. We identified political and governance challenges 
that are likely to hinder target achievement. Our findings 
suggest a need invest in improving governance, and to 
focus attention on collaboration and coalition building 
across different government sectors and with actors outside 
the government. Future work can explore the relationship 
between different styles of governance and health outcomes. 
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